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A survey of ordinary members of the UK’s Conservative Party 
carried out in 2013 revealed that nearly 30% of them would 
seriously consider voting for the country’s radical right wing 
populist party, UKIP.  However, we show that at the general 
election in 2015 only a very small proportion of them – around 5% 
of Tory grassroots members – actually did so, driven it seems 
mainly by alienation from the leadership and David Cameron in 
particular, as well as, perhaps, by concerns about the 
Conservative-led government’s austerity policies.  On the other 
hand, those party members who did eventually vote for UKIP were 
still much more likely to have expressed a propensity to vote for it 
in 2013 than those who did not.  Since the Tories have not 
experienced the same increase in membership as some of its 
competitors, and since members are an important part of parties’ 
electoral campaigning, they should avoid alienating those 
members they do have – something Theresa May appears to be 
aware of. 
 
Keywords: party members; party membership; Conservative Party; 
UKIP; propensity to vote (PTV) 
 
 
The 2015 general election saw the United Kingdom Independence Party, then 
led by Nigel Farage, win over four million votes, although that impressive total 
secured it only one seat in the Commons – that of Douglas Carswell, the MP 
for Clacton in Essex who had defected from the Tories to UKIP just seven 
months previously. Carswell, of course, was not the only Conservative to have 
jumped ship: the most high-profile may have been Mark Reckless, MP for 
Rochester and Strood in Kent, who joined UKIP in the following month; but 
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there had already been lower level defections at local council level, as well as 
tales of grassroots Tories either leaving their party to join Farage’s ‘People’s 
Army’ or at least backing it at the ballot box in what for CCHQ (Conservative 
Campaign Headquarters) were worrying numbers – especially in the wake of 
UKIP finishing first on 27 per cent of the vote in elections to the European 
Parliament in May 2014. This anecdotal evidence was reinforced by an 
academic, survey-based study of Conservative Party members carried out in 
the summer of 2013, which suggested that well over a quarter of them were 
seriously considering voting for UKIP (see Bale and Webb, 2014). More 
precisely, said study found 28.9% of grassroots Tories surveyed scored the 
UKIP between seven and ten on a standard ten point ‘propensity to vote’ 
(PTV) scale running from zero (never) to ten (very likely).1  Significantly, this 
was after, not before, Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron made his 
‘Bloomberg speech’ in January 2013 in which he promised the country an in-
out referendum on the UK’s membership of the European Union – a promise 
made at least partly in response to concerns that, unless it were made, his 
party risked losing support to UKIP and becoming unmanageable, both at 
Westminster and out in the country (Seldon and Snowdon, 2016; Bale, 2016). 
 
For Cameron, at least, that promise proved a fateful one: on June 24 2016, in 
the immediate wake of the defeat of his campaign to persuade voters to keep 
the country in the EU, he announced his intention to step down as Tory leader 
and Prime Minister. But for the Conservative Party, the promise to hold a 
referendum may have been a wise move – at least in electoral and 
organizational terms.  True, government whips at Westminster could rarely 
afford to relax completely after the Bloomberg speech as Conservative 
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eurosceptics put parliamentary pressure on Cameron to firm up his 
referendum pledge.  But the party in the country held together (at least until 
the election) and (along with some well-targeted spending, a poorly-regarded 
opposition, surging Scottish nationalism, an economic recovery, and a Liberal 
Democrat collapse) helped the Tories to win an unexpected overall majority in 
May 2015, notwithstanding the fact that UKIP – the populist insurgency that 
initially looked like it would hurt them much more than it would hurt Labour 
–  did so well (Geddes and Tonge, 2015, Cowley and Kavanagh, 2015, Mellon 
and Evans, 2016 and Clarke et al., 2016).  That was at least partly because, as 
we go on to show, only a minority even of those ordinary Conservative Party 
members who were sorely tempted to switch to UKIP eventually succumbed to 
its charms. 
 
Survey research on party members is a growing, international field, with a 
European network of scholars coordinated by the MAPP project, hosted by the 
Université libre de Bruxelles and convened by one of the authors of a recent 
edited volume on the subject (see van Haute and Gauja, 2015).2  But the 
pioneering studies were carried out in the UK by Patrick Seyd and Paul 
Whiteley and their various collaborators.  Indeed, one of the earliest studies, 
which focused primarily on trying to understand what led people to join the 
organization, was of the Conservative Party (Whiteley, Seyd and Richardson, 
1994).  Hopes that follow-up surveys could be conducted foundered on the 
reluctance of the party to co-operate until, with the advent of a commercial 
pollster who had assembled an internet panel of sufficient size to enable 
researchers to survey the requisite number of respondents, work was able to 
begin again without the need to involve the party directly – an approach which 
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led to study which focused on members’ attitudes to the role of women among 
Tory members (Childs and Webb, 2011).  The same approach was used more 
recently to study Conservative Party members’ attitudes to coalition (Bale and 
Webb, 2016) and the probability that some of them would support UKIP 
rather than their own party in 2015 (Webb and Bale, 2014) – a study which 
not only revealed (as we have seen above) that the latter represented a 
significant minority but also that those members most tempted to do so were 
(a) particularly concerned about immigration and Europe, (b) felt 
undervalued or even disrespected by their own leadership, and (c) regarded 
that leadership as ideologically more remote from them than was UKIP. 
 
One of the advantages of commissioning that commercial pollster to conduct a 
survey of party members in the summer of 2013 was that we are now 
effectively able to revisit our sample in order to compare how those party 
members were tempted to vote just under two years from a general election 
with how they actually voted (or at least recalled voting) when the general 
election was eventually held in the late spring of 2015. Conducting this 
comparison also allows us to explore what best predicts their decision to do so.  
Did those ordinary party members who were in effect threatening to vote for 
another party actually carry out that threat?  Or did most of them stick with 
their party when it came to the crunch?  And what was the difference between 
those who did and those who didn’t? Clearly any such defections at the ballot 
box can have had only the most marginal effect – at least in terms of members’ 
individual votes – even in constituencies where the race between the parties 
was closest.  But they are nonetheless of considerable interest to scholars of 
political parties and their members: the latter are, after all, generally supposed 
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to be both a source of guaranteed votes and act as ‘ambassadors to the 
community’ boosting support for the party among rather less engaged citizens 
(Scarrow, 1996: 43). 
 
Data and Method 
YouGov conducted an internet survey of 852 Conservative Party members 
between 31 May and 11 June 2013, and were then able to return to the sample 
post-election to find out how these respondents actually voted. Note that, 
because this is not a random probability sample one cannot, strictly speaking, 
compute a margin of error for our data but given the size of our sample and 
the estimated membership of the Conservative Party, a standard calculator 
would put it at around 4% (with a 95% confidence level).  Note, too, that the 
data are not weighted in any way. We decided to work with the raw data for 
two reasons: first, there are no known population parameters that could be 
used for the Conservative Party membership's demographic profile; second, a 
previous YouGov survey of the party's members conducted at the time of the 
leadership election in December 2005 produced an extremely accurate 
prediction of the final result on the basis of raw data (i.e. to within one 
percentage point of the actual result).3 Attempts to weight that data on that 
occasion made no appreciable difference to the outcome. In this respect, we 
follow previous practice regarding recent academic surveys of the 
Conservative Party membership (see Childs and Webb, 2012; Webb and Bale, 
2014). Note too that previous research suggests that in the UK results from 
national internet samples compare well with probability samples (Sanders 
et al. 2007). Drawing on this dataset, we compare members’ declared 
propensity to vote (PTV) for UKIP at the next general election to their actual, 
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self-reported vote in 2015.  We first look at the extent to which those who 
seemed most likely to vote for UKIP in 2013 actually turned out to vote for the 
party in 2015. We then look at whether those who voted Conservative and 
those who voted UKIP present significant differences in demographic and 
ideological characteristics. Finally, we model the choice to vote UKIP as 
opposed to Conservative with three binary logistic regressions.  It is of course 
only right to express a degree of caution in interpreting our findings because 
of the low N of UKIP-inclined Tory party members on which part of our 
analysis is inevitably based. It is worth noting, however, that the percentage of 
Conservative Party members who voted for UKIP in our dataset is similar to 
that found among both Conservative Party members and strong supporters in 
the British Election Study (BES) internet panel dataset and that our findings 
are encouragingly consistent with those on the attitudinal drivers of UKIP 
voters in the electorate more generally (Ford and Goodwin, 2014).4  
 
Results 
The first thing to note is that the individuals who comprised the sample of 
Conservative Party members in 2013 proved overwhelmingly likely to have 
actually voted in 2015; some 99% reported having done so and there was 
almost no difference in participation rates between those who voted for 
Conservative candidates and those who eventually voted for candidates from 
other parties. 5 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Of greater interest is the question of which party Tory grassroots members 
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actually voted for in 2015. Table 1 reports the results, and does reveal an effect 
of some interest. There is no denying that, when it came to the crunch, 
Conservative Party members proved overwhelmingly loyal to their party, with 
93% voting for Tory candidates in 2015.  However, it is also quite clear that 
those party members most likely to indicate that they might opt for UKIP in 
2013 were indeed the members most likely to actually vote for Nigel Farage’s 
party in 2015. Of those who scored 0-3 on the 'likelihood to vote UKIP' scale in 
2013, just 3 (0.9%) actually voted UKIP in 2015. Of those who scored 4-6, only 
1 (0.7%) voted UKIP. But of those who scored 7-10, some 16.2% (28) voted 
UKIP. 
 
One way of looking at this is to conclude that the Tories did well overall at 
holding on to the electoral support of their members. On the other hand, those 
in the 7-10 category constituted getting on for thirty per cent of the 
membership sample, so constitute a non-trivial number. A comparison 
between Conservative members and voters certainly confirms as much. 
Overall, about 5% of our 2013 Tory members voted for UKIP in 2015 (and – 
interestingly although this is not our focus here – 2.5% to other non-
Conservative parties), compared to 4.7% of voters who told the BES they 
strongly identified with the Conservative Party and 12.1% of those who told 
the BES they voted Tory in 2010.6 So, being a party member certainly 
increases the prospect of voter loyalty (unsurprisingly), but it is by no means 
absolutely guarantee it. Translated to the 150,000 members that the Tories 
claimed to have in 2015, we can infer that about 7,300 party members might 
have defected to UKIP at the polls. We cannot rule out the possibility, of 
course, that some of this switching might have been down to tactical voting by 
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members who, for example, happened to live in a safe Labour seat. Although 
the size of this group in our data does not allow us to statistically test the 
influence of seat marginality,  it is unlikely that this would account for the 
whole of the difference between those in the lower and higher ‘likelihood to 
defect’ categories: since, as we go on to show below, we have found that a 
number of key explanatory variables are significant (and in the expected 
direction), if tactical voting is an important factor, it is also significantly 
related to these variables.  It therefore seems a reasonable inference that a 
significant number of those most attracted to UKIP ended up voting for Nigel 
Farage’s party for non-tactical reasons. 
 
So what might these reasons be? In a previous paper (Webb & Bale 2014), 
researchers pointed to a number of factors that were associated with a 
Conservative party member expressing the possibility that he or she might 
vote for UKIP. Most prominent were general ideological orientations (in both 
left-right and social liberalism/authoritarianism terms), hostility to the EU 
and immigration, and a sense of alienation from the party leadership. Have 
these factors been important in moving the minority of members who actually 
voted for UKIP? Table 2 provides some insights showing when differences 
between groups are statistically significant. Compared to Tory members who 
stayed loyal to their party at the polls in 2015, those who voted for UKIP were 
significantly more likely to be male and from a lower socio-economic class. 
They are also slightly younger and less likely to be educated to graduate level, 
though not significantly so. In terms of general ideological orientation, Tory 
members who voted for UKIP are (arguably like UKIP itself) significantly less 
right-wing – relatively speaking at least – on the traditional left-right 
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dimension, covering matters like the distribution and ownership of wealth 
and business and workers .  But they are no different from their fellow Tory 
members in terms of their social or cultural conservatism, namely their 
attitudes on matters such as respect for traditional values, authority and the 
law, stiffer sentences for wrong-doing, and the need for censorship.7 They also 
see themselves as significantly further away from their then leader, David 
Cameron, in left-right terms (in both directions) than those who voted Tory, 
and somewhat less distant from UKIP, though not significantly so.  
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
In terms of the current issue and leadership evaluations which might impact 
on voting behaviour in this context, we can see that attitude to non-EU 
immigration does not significantly differentiate the two groups of party 
members, but several others do. First, feelings about the EU are an evident 
point of difference, with significantly more of the Conservative Party members 
who plumped for UKIP indicating that they would vote for British withdrawal 
from the EU immediately or, indeed, even after re-negotiation. Second, they 
are also significantly less likely to feel that David Cameron is doing a good job 
as prime minister, or that the party leadership really respects the 
membership. Third, there is even a hint (although with a lower level of 
significance) that they are more opposed to gay marriage than those members 
who did not vote for UKIP. What happens when we examine the impact of 
these factors in a multivariate model?  
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
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Table 3 reports the results of three binary logistic regressions, with UKIP v 
Conservative voting preference as the dependent variable.8 In order to correct 
for the potential bias that can be introduced into the models when there is a 
small number of cases on the rarer of the two outcomes - which, in this 
instance is voting for UKIP (N=32) rather than the Conservatives (N=598) - 
logistic regression models are run using the bias-correction method proposed 
by King and Zeng (2001), implemented in the Stata command relogit.9 Model 
1 consists of demographics only, while Model 2 adds in general ideological 
orientations, and Model 3 augments this with various issue and leadership 
evaluations that might be relevant (the full model). The only demographic 
variables reported in Model 1 that show any significant effects are class and 
gender. Social grade AB members (ie, professionals and managers) are 
significantly less likely to vote UKIP than social grade ‘DE’ members (ie, semi-
skilled, unskilled, and casual manual workers), while men are significantly 
more likely than women to do so. Education and age make no difference. 
When the ideological scales are added into the equation (Model 2), social class 
and gender retain their significance, although only at the 10% level; in 
addition, we see that left-right orientation matters, but liberty-authority does 
not; that is, the more (distributionally) left-wing a Conservative member is, 
the greater the chance that she or he (but more likely he) will vote UKIP.  
 
Finally, once the issue and leadership evaluations are added (Model 3), social 
class and gender lose their significance, although left-right orientation 
remains significant. Only two of the issue/leadership evaluations prove 
significant in the context of this full model: perceived ideological distance 
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from Cameron and perceived respect for members shown by the leadership. 
The former means that the greater the perceived left-right distance from 
Cameron (in either direction), the more likely the member is to have voted for 
UKIP in the general election. The latter means that the less a respondent feels 
the leadership respects the membership, the more likely he or she is to have 
voted for UKIP in the general election. 
 
Thus, in the final analysis, only three factors appear to have significantly 
influenced the decision to vote for UKIP once other considerations are 
controlled for: being less right-wing on distributional issues, the perception 
that one is ideologically distant from Cameron, and a sense of being afforded 
insufficient respect by the leadership. By contrast, the parallel model of 
likelihood to vote UKIP that was reported in advance of the general election 
(Webb & Bale 2014) also found significant effects for the liberty-authority 
scale, and attitudes to non-EU immigration and the EU referendum. These 
three effects have been washed out when it comes to actual, as opposed to 
projected, voting behaviour in the general election.  
 
Clearly, then, a number of factors rendered Tory members susceptible to the 
lure of UKIP, but in the event most people remained loyal to their party; those 
who went the whole way and actually voted for UKIP at the 2015 general 
election did so because they felt seriously under-valued by the leadership, and 
because they felt their ideological differences with Cameron were too great. 
The latter perception may indeed be rooted in the fact that their underlying 
ideological orientation was not entirely in tune with that of the government. 
On the one hand, in the context of the politics of the 2010-15 period, it may be 
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that this reflects doubts about the government’s austerity agenda. Some 
support for this interpretation is offered by responses to questions about how 
strongly members’ supported certain actions by that government: thus, while 
82% of those members who voted loyally for the Conservatives strongly 
supported the attempts to reduce the national debt and public sector deficit, 
only 56% of those Tory members who voted for UKIP did so; and while 70% of 
the former strongly supported the government cap on housing benefit 
payments, only 59% of the latter did. This is broadly consistent with 
something we know about UKIP voters in general – that, despite the right-
wing label routinely attached to the party, its supporters are not notably keen 
on what some would call neo-liberal policies (Ford & Goodwin 2014).  On the 
other hand, party members who voted for UKIP do prove to have been more 
socially conservative than those who stuck with the Conservative Party in 
2015. Some confirmation of this interpretation is offered by the difference 
between the two groups shown in Table 1 with the former group being more 
Eurosceptic and against gay marriage than the latter group. Thus, UKIP 
picked up some support from dissatisfied Tories both on the right with its 
cultural conservatism and on the left by being critical of the coalition 
government’s economic agenda. 
 
Conclusion 
In 2013, getting on for 30% of Conservative Party members suggested that 
they would seriously consider voting for UKIP – a level of disillusion and 
alienation that, had it continued into 2015, could have represented a loss of 
valuable campaign effort at the general election of that year, not least because 
work in progress clearly shows that a party’s members are much more likely 
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than its supporters to carry out ‘high-intensity’ activities like canvassing 
(Webb, Poletti and Bale, 2016).  In the event, the proportion of Tory members 
who actually voted for UKIP when it came to the crunch appears to have been 
much smaller, at just 5%.  Many, in other words, might have been tempted by 
the fruit of another, but when it came to it most decided not to take a bite.  
That said, those members who did ‘defect’ were considerably more likely to 
have signalled in 2013 that they might do so than were those members who 
remained loyal, perhaps reinforcing the contention that propensity to vote 
scores are a useful indicator for survey researchers. When it came to members’ 
motives for their actions, those who eventually plumped for UKIP were more 
likely than those who voted Tory to feel that they were a long way away, 
ideologically speaking, from their party’s then-leader, David Cameron.  They 
were also more likely to feel that the leadership had little respect for 
grassroots members.  Those voting for UKIP were also a little less ‘right-wing’ 
(in the sense of favouring business and the market over government) on 
economic issues than their fellow members. 
 
Academic observers may have found Cameron’s attempt to modernise the 
Conservative Party from 2005 onwards less than wholehearted or impressive 
(see Hayton, 2015 and Peele and Francis, 2016).  Yet that effort nevertheless 
appears to have alienated a sizeable chunk of his grassroots supporters from 
Cameron himself.  Research suggests that voters more generally ‘respond 
negatively to increasing sociodemographic distance from party leaders’ 
(Cutler, 2002).  But it was not the fact that, relative to every other Tory leader 
since 1965, Cameron enjoyed such a privileged upbringing that saw him run 
into trouble with at least some of his party’s members.  Rather, it was the fact 
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that he took it upon himself to embody and drive the changes he claimed the 
Tories simply had to make, including, most controversially perhaps, equal 
marriage (Bale, 2016: 236-359). Indeed, the passage of the Marriage (Same 
Sex Couples) Bill, which passed through the House in 2013 and the remarks 
made in May 2013, supposedly by someone very close to Cameron, about Tory 
activists being ‘swivel-eyed loons’ constituted something of a perfect storm, 
the impact of which was still being felt (at least by some grassroots Tories) two 
years later. The same, of course, could be said for austerity and the marked 
failure of the coalition government to live up to its repeated promises to do 
something about what many (including many ordinary Conservatives) saw as 
the excessive rewards beginning to flow again to the very same business 
people whose earlier recklessness had, at least in part, made that austerity 
necessary in the first place.   
 
Turning around the telescope, our research suggests not only that party 
members are much more likely to turn out to vote than non-members but that 
they are, as one would expect, overwhelmingly likely to vote for the party to 
which they belong. Although far more members than one might think are 
apparently willing to consider voting for other parties, most of them do not 
end up doing so. Whether hints that they might do so reflect genuine 
indecision, temporary dissatisfaction, a desire to signal to the party’s 
leadership that something has to change, or, indeed, a mix of all three motives 
remains a moot point.10 However, given how low (although not negligible) the 
risk that members who suggest they might vote for other parties will actually 
do so, their leaders should probably trouble themselves less about that and 
more about ensuring that they maintain their membership levels.  While the 
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latter is not something that a number of UK parties, in stunning contrast to 
their European counterparts, would appear to need to worry about right now, 
they need to remind themselves that the surges they have experienced in 
recent years may turn out to be temporary.  If that is the case, then the 
Conservative Party, whose (post-Brexit) bounce has been much less marked 
than the (post-Scottish Independence Referendum) and (Corbyn) booms 
experienced by the SNP and by Labour, will need to think even harder than its 
competitors about how to respond.  Given how many of its current members 
have thought seriously about UKIP, Theresa May’s fairly transparent attempt 
to airbrush David Cameron out of Tory history and colonise some of Nigel 
Farage’s territory may be a very smart move. 
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Notes
																																																								
1  Survey researchers who feel that obliging respondents to make a 
‘forced’ (or ipsative) choice between parties will obscure some of the subtleties 
of their preferences can present them (either instead of or in addition to 
asking them who they would vote for ‘if there were an election tomorrow’) 
with a list of parties and ask them about the likelihood that they would ever 
vote for each of them.  This has the advantage of giving a score to all parties, 
and not just to the preferred party, allowing researchers to explore how close 
the competition between parties really is. This ‘propensity to vote’ (PTV) score 
has not only been widely used by commercial and academic survey researchers 
in recent years but has also generated a useful academic literature. Some of it 
is methodological, in the sense of arguing for the merits of the technique: see 
van der Eijk, van der Brug, Kroh, and Franklin (2006) and van der Eijk and 
Marsh (2007) as well as De Angelis and Garzia, (2013). Some of it is 
substantive, in the sense of using it to conduct debates about contemporary 
elections and voters’ choices: see Vegetti, Poletti and Segatti (2013) on Italy, 
Wall, Krouwel, and Vitiello (2014) on the Netherlands and, on Great Britain, 
Mellon and Evans (2016), who use the fact that, as revealed by PTV scores, 
45% of Conservative supporters have UKIP as a second preference, compared 
to just 19% of Labour supporters, in order to argue against the idea that the 
17	
	
																																																																																																																																																														
UK’s populist radical right party does as much (if not more) electoral damage, 
to the centre-left as the centre-right. 
2   For more information on MAPP (which also very conveniently collates 
all publications on party members as they appear) see its website: 
http://www.projectmapp.eu/  
3		 	 Indeed, YouGov polls achieved similar accuracy in respect of the 
Labour leadership elections of 2015 and 2016.	
4   This is similar, incidentally, to the 3% of Conservative Party 
members identified in the British Election Study Internet panel waves 1.0 & 
6.0, who voted for UKIP. That panel contained a core-weighted sample of 138 
Conservative Party members – smaller than the number in our specific survey 
and too small a number on which to carry out any useful analysis. 
5  The 99% figure is almost bound to include some over-reporting if party 
members are anything like ordinary voters.  In 2010, according to Whiteley 
(2016:17) ‘about 10 per cent [of ordinary voters] claimed to have voted but did 
not, and 1.5 per cent claimed not to have voted when in fact they did. Of the 
very small number who did not turn out at the polls, almost all were in the 
category that was most favourable to UKIP in 2013: that is, 60% scored ‘7-10’ 
on the PTV 'likelihood to vote UKIP at the next general election' scale. This 
suggests that one way in which disaffected Tories might have acted was to 
abstain from voting rather than to defect to UKIP (or any other party). 
However, the numbers are too small (just 5 respondents) to infer this with any 
degree of confidence. 
6  These figures are derived from analysis of the fully-weighted British 
Election Study Internet panel, waves 1.0 and 6.0.  
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7  The data has a detailed series of questions designed to measure how 
left or right-wing people are on matters of distributional politics and another 
series of questions designed to tap how culturally liberal or authoritarian they 
are. Responses to these questions can be combined to form well-established 
additive scales that give a much more valid and reliable measure of 
respondents' ideological characteristics (Heath et al 1994). The individual 
items on which these scales are based are as follows: Left-right scale 
indicators: Please tell us whether you agree or disagree with the following 
statements: Government should redistribute income from the better-off to 
those who are less well off;  Big business benefits owners at the expense of 
workers; Ordinary people do not get their fair share of the nation’s wealth; 
There is one law for the rich and one for the poor; Management will always try 
to get the better of employees if it gets the chance. Liberty-authority scale 
indicators:  Young people today don’t have enough respect for traditional 
values; People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences; For some 
crimes the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence; Schools should 
teach children to obey authority; The law should always be obeyed, even if a 
particular law is wrong; Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to 
uphold moral standards. Respondents could select from the following options 
in answering each of these questions:  (1) Strongly agree; (2) Tend to agree; 
(3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Tend to disagree; (5) Strongly disagree; (6) 
Don’t know.  Don't knows are excluded from analysis, and all left-right item 
responses are coded so that 1 is the most left-wing option, and 5 the most-
right-wing option (final scale range is 5-25), while all liberty-authority item 
responses are coded so that 1 is the most socially or culturally authoritarian 
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option and 5 the most socially or culturally liberal option (final scale range is 
6-30). Cronbach's alpha for the left-right scale is  0.845 and for the liberty-
authority scale is 0 .710, indicating that both comfortably meet conventional 
standards of scale reliability. 
8  Codings for the variables used in the models in Table 3 are as follows: 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Voted for UKIP/Conservatives: 1 = UKIP, 0 = Conservatives. 
 
Independent variables: 
Demographic variables - 
Age: Respondent's age in years. 
Social grade: 1 = AB, 2 = C1, 3=C2, 4=DE. 
Sex: 1 = male, 2 = female 
Education: 0 = no formal qualifications; 1 = sub-graduate qualifications; 2 = 
graduate or higher. 
 
Broad ideological predispositions - 
Left-right scale: Scale runs from 5 (left) to 25 (right)  
Liberty-authority scale: Scale runs from 6 (socially authoritarian) to 30 
(socially liberal)  
 
Current issue and leadership evaluations - 
Cameron gap: Perceived gap between Cameron and respondent on general 
left-right scale (0=no LR distance, 10=maximum LR distance); a positive 
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figure indicates Cameron is perceived as being more distant from the 
respondent, regardless of the direction of the distance. 
UKIP gap: Perceived gap between UKIP and respondent on left-right scale 
(0=no LR distance, 10=maximum LR distance); a positive figure indicates 
UKIP is perceived as being as being more distant from the respondent, 
regardless of the direction of the distance. 
EU referendum: If there were a vote on Britain’s membership of the EU 
today, how would you vote? 1 – Would vote to remain; 2 Would vote to leave. 
Immigration limits: How far do you support government action to limit 
immigration from non-EU countries? 1 Strongly oppose limits to 
immigration; 2 Oppose; 3 Neither support nor oppose; 4 Support; 5 Strongly 
support limits to immigration. 
Gay marriage support: How far do you support the introduction of 
legislation allowing for gay marriage? 1 Strongly Oppose; 2 Oppose; 3 Neither 
support nor oppose; 4 Support; 5 Strongly Support. 
Respect members: To what extent, if at all, do you think the Conservative 
party leadership respects ordinary party members? 1 Does not respect them 
at all; 2 Does not respect them very much; 3 Neither respect them nor 
disrespect them; 4 Respects them quite a lot; 5 Respects them a lot. 
9  When there is a small number of cases on the rarer of the two outcomes 
of the logistic model, there is no problem with the model itself. The problem is 
that maximum likelihood estimation might suffer from small-sample bias, 
which is dependent on the number of cases in the less frequent of the two 
categories. In our case, the small-sample bias is very small and no substantive 
differences exist between the standard binary logistic regression and the 
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corrected logistic regression estimates. See appendix for standard binomial 
regression results. 
10     One might of course argue that party members might try to hide from 
‘liberal’ researchers that they actually voted UKIP. This potential bias, 
however, would affect vote declaration in the same way as it would their 
expression of propensity to vote. Moreover, Internet surveys are arguably less 
vulnerable to this phenomenon than phone and especially face-to-face 
interviews. 
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Tables 
 
99). 
 
Table 1: Declared likelihood to vote for UKIP 2013, and actual vote 
2015 
 
 Likelihood to vote UKIP (0-10 
scale) 
 
Voted for: 0-3 
Unlikely 
to vote 
UKIP 
4-6 
Possible 
UKIP 
voters 
7-10 
Likely 
UKIP 
voters	 
Total 
Conservative 96.2 97.9 81.5 92.6 
Labour 0.6 0.7 1.2 0.8 
Liberal Democrat 1.3 0 0.6 0.8 
SNP 0.3 0 0 0.2 
UKIP 0.9 0.7 16.2 5.0 
Green 0 0.7 0 0.2 
Other 0.6 0 0.6 0.5 
 Total 100 100 100 100 
N 319 144 173 636 
 
Cramer’s V = .234 (p<.001), n=636  
 
23	
	
Table 2: 
Differences between Tory members who voted Conservative and 
those who voted UKIP in 2015 
 
 Voted 
Conservative 
Voted 
UKIP 
Sig. 
Difference 
 (N=598) (N=32)  
Demographic factors:    
Average age (to nearest complete year) 60 57  
% social grade ABC1  84.1 68.7 * 
% graduates 62.3 56.3  
% males 67.7 84.4 * 
Location on:     
Left-right scale (5-25) 18.0 14.4 *** 
Liberty-authority scale (6-30) 12.9 12.7  
Perception of:     
LR gap from Cameron (in either 
direction) (0-10) 
1.77 3.59 ** 
LR gap from UKIP (in either 
direction)(0-10) 
1.98 1.69  
% supporting or agreeing 
with/that: 
   
Cameron is doing well as Prime Minister 79.3 50.0 *** 
EU withdrawal today 69.6 93.8 *** 
EU withdrawal after re-negotiation 34.6 65.6 ** 
Reduced immigration from non-EU 
countries 
89.8 90.7   
No gay marriage legislation 58.9 75.0 a 
Leadership lacks respect for members 49.9 87.5 *** 
 
Notes:	 	Figures	are	means	 for	 continuous	variables	 (t-test	group	difference)	and	percentages	 for	 categorical	variables	 (chi-square	
group	difference).	 a	p	<	0.1	 	 *p	<	0.05	 for	between	groups	differences;	 **	p	<	0.01	 for	between	groups	differences;	 ***p	<	0.001	 for	
between	groups	differences.		
Left-right	scale	runs	from	5	(left)	to	25	(right);	Liberty-authority	scale	runs	from	6	(social	authoritarian)	to	30	(social	liberal);	Left-
right	Cameron	gap	and	left-right	UKIP	gap	are	scales	measuring	the	absolute	distance	(i.e.	both	to	the	right	and	to	the	left)	between	
the	 left-right	 self-positioning	of	 the	 respondent	and	 the	positon	on	 the	 same	 scale	attributed	by	 the	 respondent	 to	Cameron	or	 to	
UKIP.	They	run	from	0	(no	LR	distance)	to	10	(maximum	LR	distance).	
	
 
24	
	
Table 3: 
Modelling vote for UKIP versus vote for Conservatives, 2015 
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Age -0.004 -0.001 0.011 
Social grade (reference category: DE)    
      AB -1.434** -1.128a -0.968 
      C1 -0.734 -0.299 -0.347 
      C2 -0.703 -0.558 -0.698 
Sex (reference category: Female) 1.102* 1.083a 0.676 
Education (reference category: Graduate)       
      No qualifications -0.401 -0.426 0.152 
      Sub-graduate qualifications 0.172 -0.233 -0.062 
Left-right scale (5-25) - -0.149** -0.142** 
Liberty-authority scale (6-30) - -0.007 0.086 
Cameron LR gap (in either direction)(0-
10) 
- - 
0.262** 
UKIP LR gap (in either direction)(0-10) - - 0.032 
EU Referendum (ref: remain) - - -1.211 
Support limits to immigration (1-5) - - 0.057 
Support gay marriage (1-5) - - 0.049 
Respect for members (1-5) - - -0.552* 
Model Nagelkerke R2 0.07 0.14 0.29 
N 616 588 536 
	
Notes:	Figures	are	logistic	regression	coefficients	run	with	bias	correction	method	proposed	by	King	and	Zeng,	2001	(Stata	command:	
relogit).	a<	0.1	*p	<	0.05;	**	p	<	0.01;	***p	<	0.01.	Nagelkerke	R2	calculated	on	standard	logistic	regression	(see	Appendix).	
Dependent	 variable	=	Voted	UKIP	 (1)	as	opposed	 to	 voted	Conservative.	Broad	 ideological	predispositions:	 Left-right	 scale	 (scale	
runs	from	5	[left]	to	25	[right]);	Liberty-authority	scale	(scale	runs	from	6	[social	authoritarian]	to	30	[social	liberal]);	Current	issue	
and	leadership	evaluations:	Left-right	Cameron	gap	and	left-right	UKIP	gap	are	scales	measuring	the	absolute	distance	(i.e.	both	to	
the	right	and	to	the	left)	between	the	left-right	self-positioning	of	the	respondent	and	the	positon	on	the	same	scale	attributed	by	the	
respondent	to	Cameron	or	to	UKIP.	They	run	from	0	(no	LR	distance)	to	10	(maximum	LR	distance).	See	endnote	8	for	more	details.	
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Appendix – 
Robustness test: Results of standard binomial logistic regression 
 
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Age -0.003 -0.001 0.009 
Social grade (reference category: DE)    
      AB -1.433** -1.133* -1.030 
      C1 -0.747 -0.305 -0.376 
      C2 -0.891 -0.750 -0.977 
Sex (reference category: Female) 1.104* 1.222* 0.836 
Education (reference category: graduate)        
      No qualifications -0.021 -0.864 -0.288 
      Sub-graduate qualifications 0.162 -0.267 -0.117 
Left-right scale (1-5) - -0.156*** -0.158*** 
Liberty-authority scale (1-5) - -0.404 0.089 
LR Cameron gap (in both directions)(0-
10) 
- - 
0.281** 
LR UKIP gap (in both directions)(0-10) - - 0.008 
EU Referendum (ref: remain) - - -1.710 
Support limits to immigration (1-5) - - 0.10 
Support gay marriage (1-5)   0.045 
Respect for members - - -0.623** 
Model Nagelkerke R2 0.07 0.15 0.29 
N 616 585 536 
	
Notes:	Figures	are	logistic	regression	coefficients.		*p	<	0.05;	**	p	<	0.01;	***p	<	0.01. 
     
 
 
 
 
